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PANEL 3:
CHRONIC PAIN, “PSYCHOGENIC”
PAIN, AND EMOTION
DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AMANDA PUSTILNIK, AND M. KAYLIE GIOIOSO
SPEAKERS: JENNIFER CHANDLER,* ROBERT DINERSTEIN,** JENNIFER A.
HAYTHORNTHWAITE,*** AND TOR D. WAGER****
I.

INTRODUCTION

Emotion and chronic pain are inextricably linked, but not always in the
ways represented in law and culture. Whether chronic pain is “physical” or
“emotional” can have important legal consequences. In disability and tort
law, it remains common for claimants who allege chronic pain to be
characterized as suffering from “psychogenic” pain—a variety of
conversion hysteria, in which the sufferer is believed to produce a physical
symptom to communicate repressed emotional distress.1 What do we know
now about chronic pain and emotion that could inform the ways that law
makes these distinctions?
In the legal system, a claimant afflicted with a physical injury might be
treated differently from one with an injury that is more psychological or
psychiatric in nature. Professor Pustilnik posed to the entire panel and
attendees: “I’d like everybody to think about whether a chronic pain

Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik.
* Professor of Law at University of Ottawa.
** Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Experiential Education, and Director of the Disability
Rights Law Clinic at American University.
*** Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Johns Hopkins
University.
**** Professor in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience and the Institute for Cognitive
Science, at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Tor Wager participated in the symposium via
Skype.
1. Jennifer Chandler, Robert Dinerstein, Jennifer A. Haythornthwaite, & Tor. D. Wager,
Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel
3: Chronic Pain, “Psychogenic” Pain, and Emotion (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 3]
(transcript on file with the editors).
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disorder is a physical impairment or an emotional impairment or both?
What do we do with something that straddles that line?”2
The objectives for this panel were to discuss the current scientific and
clinical importance of distinctions between organic and psychogenic pain;
discuss when legal doctrines do—and when they should—distinguish
between these pain etiologies; and discuss the norms in law about the
relationship between emotional and chronic pain that may be a disadvantage
to pain sufferers or that may impede accuracy in legal outcomes.3
II.

“ORGANIC” VERSUS “PSYCHOGENIC” PAIN

The idea of a distinction among organic, social, emotional, physical,
real, imagined, or some other sort of pain is important both in the context of
research and in the legal context. We begin by asking if such distinctions
are made in disability and other areas of law, and whether a claimant’s pain
that is classified as “organic” or “psychogenic” would have an impact on a
legal proceeding.4
A.

Distinctions in the Law Between Physical Injury and “Emotional”
Injury

Professor Dinerstein suggested that in disability law, there is usually
some effort to determine whether the pain is debilitating in a way to which
one could relate.5 For a given case, the questions that usually arise are “how
can we know whether something is causing pain [and] how do we know
whether something is affecting somebody in a way? Physically, we feel we

2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 1, 3.
4. Id. at 1. A separate issue that was not discussed in the panel but is relevant to the overall
topic is the relationship between chronic pain, cognitive function, and mood and affective
disorders. Several studies have indicated that people who suffer from chronic pain have emotional
and cognitive impairments. See, e.g., Apkar V. Apkarian, Chronic Pain Patients are Impaired on
an Emotional Decision-Making Task, 108 J. PAIN 129, 132–35 (2004) (noting that chronic pain
may result in cognitive disruption, which may negatively affect patients’ performance on certain
tasks). These impairments tend to be relatively mild. Id. For example, cognitive impairments can
include minor reductions in task accuracy or reaction times, decision making, and working
memory. Id.
5. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that we should look at what we know about
psychological impairment and find solutions regarding how to handle it rather than characterize
it); see also RICHARD C. RUSKELL, SOC. SEC. DISABILITY CLAIMS HANDBOOK § 2:16 (2014 ed.)
(noting that supportive evidence is necessary in most cases to prove that pain is not imaginary or
exaggerated).
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can [know, but] with emotional or psychological harm, we may not.”6
Juries may be able to empathize with a plaintiff’s claim of physical harm
more than with a claim of emotional or psychological harm.7
B.

Tort Law

Tort law provides compensation for physical injuries, but generally not
for pure “emotional” injuries.8 Thus, characterizing pain as “physical”
versus “emotional” can lead to completely different outcomes. As Professor
Chandler noted, in a tort case, “the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, [as he
or she] has to prove that their condition was caused by the defendant’s
wrongful act . . . .”9 In other words, “the plaintiff has to marshal this
evidence linking [a] chronic pain condition to the defendant’s wrongful
act.”10
In tort law, courts evaluate physical disabilities in regards to what the
“reasonable person” with those disabilities would or should be able to do.11
Courts do not expect a blind person, for example, to have the same
capabilities as someone who is sighted.12 But the precise definition of the
reasonable blind person is difficult to pin down, as “if you’re blind, must
you have a service animal with you? Must you have a cane? Well maybe

6. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 1.
7. See id. (noting that juries are composed of people selected out of the general population,
and the general population often has trouble connecting to emotional or psychological harm); see
also Jonathan P. Vallano, Psychological Injuries and Legal Decision Making in Cases: What We
Know and What We Do Not Know, 6 PSYCHOL. INJ. & LAW 99, 110 (2013) (noting that plaintiffs
with psychological injuries are not fairly compensated, most likely because of improper
perceptions of the legitimacy of such injuries).
8. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 12; see also M. Lee Huffaker, Recovery for Infliction of
Emotional Distress: A Comment on the Mental Anguish Accompanying Such a Claim in Alabama,
52 ALA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2001) (noting Professor Chandler’s thoughts as to how, unlike in the
United States, Canada and other commonwealth countries recognize torts of intentional and
negligent infliction of psychiatric and psychological harm).
9. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see generally JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 11:16 (3d ed. 2014) (enumerating that a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, that the duty was breached, and that the breach was the
cause of plaintiff’s injuries).
10. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14.
11. Id. at 3; see also Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis:
How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1735–36
(2007) (highlighting the need for a subjective standard of liability for persons with mental
disabilities that is comparable to the standard that exists for people with physical disabilities).
12. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 3; see also Coker v. McDonald’s Corp., 537 A.2d 549, 550–51
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1987) (stating that a blind person must only exercise due care because he is not
bound to perceive all that a sighted person would).
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you choose not [to] do those things. And choosing not [to] use those things
might be reasonable in some circumstances and might not in others.”13
Professor Chandler noted that in examining Canadian tort cases
involving chronic pain,
there is often a lot of discussion about [the] thin skull
[doctrine].14 This is an unusual response to [a] chronic pain
condition. It suggests there is an unusual vulnerability in
the plaintiff . . . . Thin skull rules . . . basically [means] you
take your victim as you find him, the extent to which they
have an unusual . . . reaction [is the defendant’s
problem] . . . . But, here’s where the problem occurs for the
plaintiff. There’s this other rule, the crumbling skull,
[which] says instead, if you’ve got someone whose
condition is deteriorating already, injury arrives, it’s then
not the defendant’s problem anymore because it was going
to happen anyway. It was on its way. Unless the defendant
did something [to speed] it up or [aggravate] it. “It was
going to happen anyway, you were crumbling, it’s not my
problem,” says the defendant.15
Professor Chandler noted that a lot of chronic pain cases seem to be
affected by this crumbling skull rule, particularly when there were “signs
that the plaintiff had preexisting psychological problems, usually of the
anxiety or mood disorder type . . . .”16 The demonstration of a preexisting
13. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 3–4. The D.C. case Poyner v. Loftus demonstrates this imprecise
standard. Poyner, 694 A.2d 69, 73 (D.C. 1997). In Poyner, a blind man who had never used a cane
and knew the area well was injured when he fell off an elevated sidewalk. Id. at 70. The sidewalk
previously had a barrier of shrubs, on which the man depended to guard the edge. Id. Once the
shrubs were removed unbeknownst to the plaintiff, he fell and was injured. Id. The court ruled that
the reasonable blind person should have been using a cane, even though there was no applicable
law in D.C. and the plaintiff had gone years without a cane. Id. at 71. The standards for physical
disability are not yet clearly delineated, and as one could imagine, the standards for mental or
emotional disabilities are even blurrier. For a discussion of white cane laws and a trenchant
critique of the Poyner case, see Adam A. Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled
in the Law of Torts, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 323, 346–53 (1999).
14. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 901 (Colo. 1992)
(noting that under the thin skull doctrine, a tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as is).
15. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see also Ian Aikenhead, Thin Skull Versus Crumbling Skull,
AMJ LAW, http://www.amjlaw.ca/thin-skull-versus-crumbling-skull/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015)
(noting the difference between thin skull and crumbling skull, and the increased liability of the
tortfeaser in the former).
16. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see also Stephen Cavanaugh, Important “Crumbling Skull”
and Threshold Decision, CAVILLATIONS (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.cavanagh.ca/blog/?p=84
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vulnerability can also affect claimants because “when courts set about
evaluating the damages payable, they look at . . . the contingencies of
life.”17 In the cases where a claimant is considered vulnerable to chronic
pain, the amount paid over time might be adjusted.18 “Causation was not
established for chronic pain because the court said we think you have the
personality that would somatize, in essence, this kind of stress, and [that
you] were going to [develop chronic pain] anyway.”19
C.

Clinical and Research Perspectives on “Organic” and
“Psychogenic” Pain

From a clinical point of view, Professor Haythornthwaite noted that
the distinction between “organic” and “psychogenic” pain might be “a
disservice to the patients that we care for in health care settings [as well as]
the people that we’re trying to serve in society when we talk about these
things.”20 Professors Haythornthwaite and Wager shared their perspectives
on this issue, and Haythornthwaite pondered the idea of a “reasonable
person” with chronic pain.21
Professor Haythornthwaite argued that, “while we may be able to
make fine distinctions in a moment under highly controlled circumstances
of somebody . . . we see that these things covary quite reliably in many
different circumstances.”22 To Professor Haythornthwaite, physical and
emotional pain are inextricably tied up in one another.23
She continued that
Across many, many different studies, across many, many
different populations, and across both acute pain and
chronic pain, there is a robust literature that suggests that
the experience of pain is influenced by people’s emotional
state. . . . [F]or example, symptoms of depression and
(discussing Hartwick w. Simser, 2004 CanLII 34512 (Can. Ont. S.C.), a case in which the
“crumbling skull” defense was applied when anxiety led to physical pain as early as two years
prior to the accident).
17. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14.
18. Id. at 23; see also George Mendelson, Chronic Pain and Compensation: A Review, 1 J.
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 135, 136 (1986) (noting the compensation system for those with
chronic pain).
19. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14 (referencing a hypothetical case).
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 8, 15–16.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 20.
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anxiety are predictive of the level of post-operative
pain. . . . There is growing data suggesting that people who
have anxiety and depressive symptoms—[but not] a
diagnosis of anxiety or depression in the psychiatric
[nomenclature]— . . . have different responses to
medicines.24
Professor Haythornthwaite also addressed a further complication in
distinguishing organic and psychogenic pain: chronic pain and psychiatric
illnesses can co-occur.25 She argued that it will be difficult to use
neuroimaging to distinguish emotional and physical components of pain as
“we have a brain that processes all of these kind of in a concurrent and
overlapping way that’s very hard to pull apart, and it’s certainly very hard
to pull apart in chronic pain.”26
Professor Wager provided a somewhat different perspective. In his
view, the distinction between psychogenic and organic pain is useful
because pain may be caused by peripheral disease processes (organic) or
processes within the brain itself (psychogenic).27 In addition, pain and
emotional distress are truly different things.28 Both psychogenic and
organic pain, however, are real and both can be considered pain and lead to
similar amounts of suffering.29 He argued that determining whether pain is
really organic or emotional in nature depends on many factors:30
24. Id. at 8; see also R.N. Jamison et al., Relationship of Negative Affect and Outcome of an
Opioid Therapy Trial Among Low Back Pain Patients, 13 PAIN PRACTICE 173, 179 (2013)
(acknowledging that many of the measures used in this study were obtained through self report,
but noting that opioids tend to be less effective for people with a negative mood); A.D. Wasan et
al., The Association Between Negative Affect and Opioid Analgesia in Patients with Discogenic
Low Back Pain, 117 J. PAIN 450, 459 (2005) (noting that psychopathology in patients decreases
the effectiveness of chronic pain treatments).
25. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 8–10; see also Richard H. Gracely et al., Fibromyalgia and
Depression,
PAIN RES. & TREATMENT 1, at 4–5 (2012),
available
at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/486590 (focusing on the similarities of fibromyalgia and
depression, including the drugs used to target them and environmental factors that affect them,
among other similar features); Gordon J.G. Asmundson & Joel Katz, Understanding the Cooccurrence of Anxiety Disorders and Chronic Pain: State-of-the-Art, 26 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY
888, 888–98 (2009) (noting that chronic pain often accompanies anxiety disorders).
26. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 9.
27. Id. at 16–18; see also LUDWIG OMBREGT, A SYSTEM OF ORTHOPAEDIC MEDICINE 320
(2013) (noting that pain may be the result of physical or psychogenic dysfunction).
28. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 17–18; see also OMBREGT, supra note 27 (highlighting that
pain may be caused by physical or psychological factors, and that the latter greatly influences the
way that people experience pain).
29. See Asmundson & Katz, supra note 25, at 889 (explaining that the contemporary
understanding of pain includes sensory and psychological influences).
30. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16.

2015]

PANEL 3

281

we can’t ask if [emotional pain is] biologically real,
because of course it’s biologically real. In my world, every
thought, every feeling has a neurophysiological basis. The
real question is can we measure it? Can we understand it?
Can we know what caused it and how to treat it? And that
seems like the distinction has to be based not on whether
it’s happening in your brain or not, but in the kinds of ways
in which a person can be expected to mitigate or prevent
it.31
D.

Stigma

Although the panelists disagreed to some extent as to whether a
distinction should exist between organic and psychogenic pain, they
unanimously agreed that society attaches a certain stigma to people who
have “non physical pain.”32 Specifically, the panelists agreed that the
medical communities, legal communities, and laypersons have a tendency
to legitimize pain that is perceived to be physical while delegitimizing pain
that is perceived to be emotional.33
Professor Dinerstein offered the contrasting examples of a claimant
who is paraplegic as a result of a motorcycle accident versus a claimant
who has schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.34 In the first scenario, society
tends to “value” the pain and life experiences of the individual. In the
second scenario, on the other hand, society would be more likely to devalue
the pain of the schizophrenic individual or to express the sentiment that he
or she should “get over it.”35

31. Id.
32. See, e.g., id. at 19–20 (explaining how the distinction relates not only to the different
sources of pain but also to the different interpretations of physical and emotional pain); see also
Martin v. Workers’ Comp. Bd. of N.S., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 514, 517 (Can.) (noting that the
Worker’s Compensation Act discriminates against chronic pain sufferers).
33. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 29–30 (describing the way a layperson fails to acknowledge
the mental component of physical pain, and how the courts and the medical community initially
treated fibromyalgia as something other than physician pain); see also Danijela Serbic & Tamar
Pincus, Diagnostic Uncertainty and Recall Bias in Chronic Low Back Pain, 155 J. PAIN 1540,
1540 (2014) (describing the vague and varied diagnoses provided to patients when the doctor
could not find a mechanical reason for the pain).
34. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 1–2 (describing how society accepts the actions of a
paraplegic as opposed to a schizophrenic, whose actions are seen as “less predictable” and “less
justifiable”).
35. See id. (describing how society’s expectation of how someone handles depression versus
paraplegia reflects the different societal expectations between physical and emotional pain).
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Professor Chandler agreed, describing the common suspicion that
people with psychological problems and chronic pain are “motivated by
secondary gain” or are simply weak.36 A 1994 Canadian trial court decision
embodied this suspicion, referring to fibromyalgia as a disorder “often
found in individuals who will not or cannot cope with everyday stresses of
life and convert this inability into acceptable physical symptoms to avoid
dealing with reality.”37 While perhaps a particularly unsympathetic
example, this case demonstrates how society’s biased sentiments toward
particular types of illnesses seep into the courtroom.
This stigma has further implications for the realm of disability law in
the workplace, as Americans have a particularly strong perception of the
“ideal worker.”38 Professor Dinerstein argued that individuals with chronic
pain who request reasonable accommodations in the workplace are
perceived to be asking for undeserved special attention.39 He goes on to say
that “as a consequence of that, you are seen or perceived as a less than ideal
worker—a ‘less than’ as compared to the ‘equal to’ that you would seek to
be. And that gets tricky.”40 Society typically responds less favorably to
individuals requesting this “special attention” than it does to those who are
able to be productive without any accommodations.41
In Canadian law, Professor Chandler noted, the Supreme Court of
Canada aimed to dispel the notion of the less than ideal worker in a 2003

36. See id. at 13 (explaining that society would tell someone suffering from emotional pain to
“buck up [and] snap out of it”); see also Macon Jones, Protecting Dr. Smith While Treating the
Chronic Pain of Mrs. Jones: Why the Indiana Medical Licensing Board Should Pass Guidelines
for Using Controlled Substances for Pain Treatment, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 696, 712 (2012)
(finding that doctors are concerned that those suffering from chronic pain can become addicted to
opioids).
37. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Mackie v. Wolf, 1994 CanLII 8994, para. 222
(Can. Alta. Q.B.).
38. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining how mental health diseases become a problem
when employers are thinking about medical insurance costs); see also Robert D. Dinerstein,
“Every Picture Tells a Story, Don’t It?”: The Complex Role of Narratives in Disability Cases, 15
NARRATIVE 40, 44 (2007) (explaining how employers see disability law as applying to a very
narrow group of individuals).
39. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that a sufferer of chronic pain would not
necessarily be discriminated against, but may instead be seen as seeking special accommodations);
see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1108–09 (2014) (describing
how disabled workers are seen as requesting special accommodations).
40. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2; see also Porter, supra note 39, at 1101 (highlighting that
workers with disabilities are not able to meet the expectations of an “ideal worker”).
41. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2 (examining the different societal views of a blind person
who forgoes reasonable accommodations compared to an individual suffering from chronic pain);
see also Porter, supra note 39, at 1108–09 (indicating that workers with disabilities are
stigmatized by employers and co-workers when asking for “special” accommodations).
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workers’ compensation case.42 In an attempt to decrease spending on
workers’ compensation in Nova Scotia, the provincial government passed a
law that decreased the benefits of chronic pain claimants in order to
“motivate [a] return to the workforce.”43 The court based on its belief that
the Nova Scotia law perpetuated “negative assumptions” about people with
chronic pain and thus rejected the decrease in benefits.44 The court’s
legitimization of chronic pain and denunciation of the related stigma has
had far reaching effects for both workers’ compensation and tort law.45
E.

Is it Time to Dispense with the Distinction Between “Neurological”
Disorders and “Psychiatric” Disorders?

Chronic pain is just one example of a disease that has both physical
and mental components. The distinction between mental versus physical, or
psychiatric versus neurological is often made in legal, medical, and social
settings.46 Building on the idea of emotional pain and the concerns
regarding the stigmatization of certain types of pain but not others, panelists
commented on whether the distinction between emotional and physical pain
retains any utility, or if it should be done away with completely.47
Professor Haythornthwaite reiterated her position that the distinction
should be eliminated, arguing that it has potentially harmful effects on
individuals who are told that their pain is “in their head.”48 Often times,

42. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Martin v. Workers’ Comp. Bd. of N.S., [2003] 2
S.C.R. 504, 517 (Can.) (recognizing that laws can perpetuate negative assumptions and attitudes).
43. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994–95, c.10,
s. 10B. (Can.).
44. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Martin, 2 S.C.R. at 517 (Can.) (determining that
the law discriminates against suffers of chronic pain, and denies “the reality of the pain suffered”).
45. See Martin, 2 S.C.R. at 517 (Can.) (finding that the Workers’ Compensation Act
discriminates against those suffering from chronic pain); see also Joanna L. Noonan & Shannon
L. Wagner, Chronic Pain Compensation in Canada, 4 INT’L J. DISABILITY, COMMUNITY. &
REHABILITATION,
no.
1,
2005,
at
4–5,
http://www.ijdcr.ca/VOL04_01_CAN/articles/wagner.shtml (finding that the holding in Martin
required all provinces with discriminatory policies to formulate new policies within six months).
46. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that the mental components of chronic pain are
measured differently in the legal and medical contexts); see also Mark A. Lumley et al., Pain and
Emotion: A Biopsychosocial Review of Recent Research, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 942, 943–44
(2011) (stating that the concept of chronic pain is accepted as encompassing “neurobiological,
psychological, and social changes”).
47. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing the difficulty of public perceptions when
relying on the idea that emotional pain has a physical component).
48. See id. at 30 (discussing the possibility that patients who are told their symptoms are “in
their head” will go through numerous unnecessary diagnostic test and surgeries); see also Martin
D. Cheatle, Depression, Chronic Pain, and Suicide Overdose: On the Edge, 12 PAIN MED. S43,
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these patients will “escalate their behavior” when doctors are unable to
identify a “physical” source of their pain, which frequently results in
misguided surgeries or diagnostic tests.49
Professor Dinerstein agreed that the misdiagnosis of an ailment when
there is no physical source that could be identified has historically “done a
lot of damage,” such as when “supposedly frigid mothers [were blamed] for
autism.”50 Accordingly, he discussed the need for a “healthy dose of
humility about what we really understand and what we don’t, and how to
act on it” when making potentially harmful distinctions between different
types of pain.51
Professor Wager pushed this concept further, noting that “the
distinction between physical and mental [pain] is a placeholder” for
something else.52 He added that “the other critical thing for me is not the
physical/mental [distinction], but what is the cause and how much of it has
to do with something you do have control over or should have control
over?”53
III.

NEUROIMAGING AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTION AND
PAIN
A.

Neuroimaging of Pain

Professor Wager provided insight to the evolving science of pain
detection and imaging, noting that many important questions remain
unanswered.54 Some of the important research questions he mentioned
included how much control a person has over pain and whether certain
S43–S44 (2011) (showing that patients who suffer from chronic pain are more likely to be
depressed and suicidal).
49. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the tendency of patients who are told that the
symptoms are in their head continually go back to their physician seeking a diagnosis); see also
Serbic & Pincus, supra note 33 (describing the difficulty that individuals with social, cognitive,
and emotional impairments face when seeking a chronic pain diagnosis).
50. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30; see also Robert L. Barkin et. al., Management of Chronic
Pain. Part II, 42 DISEASE-A-MONTH 459, 469 (1996) (describing how many chronic pain diseases
cannot be diagnosed through traditional diagnostic means); Cheatle, supra note 48 (finding that
chronic pain increases the risk factors for depression and suicide).
51. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30 (arguing that society should recognize that chronic pain is not
completely understood, and therefore society should not judge those suffering from it).
52. See id.
53. Id.; see also id. at 19 (describing how pain is manipulated through stimuli and voluntary
regulation).
54. Id. at 18; see also id. at 2 (describing the advancements of functional magnetic resonance
imaging and positron emission tomography in investigating emotions in the brain).
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people might be predisposed to developing chronic pain.55 Neuroimaging
can be useful in helping us understand the neural basis of different types of
pain and the factors—such as mood and anxiety—associated with pain.

B.

Interactions of Pain and Emotion

Professor Wager offered the case of Philip Pizzo as an illuminating
example of the interplay of the physical and emotional symptoms of pain.56
Pizzo, the former Dean of Stanford Medical School, injured his back while
lifting his suitcase onto a conveyor belt at the airport and “went from being
very high functioning to showing signs of depression.”57 Even with his
prominent position in the medical community, Pizzo found it difficult to
obtain a proper diagnosis, as doctors wondered whether his symptoms were
fictional.58 Although Pizzo’s pain was eventually discovered to be a result
of a “rare and hard to detect impingement of his sciatic nerve,” Wager
opines that “it’s likely that [Pizzo’s] experience with chronic pain changed
his outlook, and so caused his depression.”59 Consequently, Wager argues
that emotional trauma or pain can cause physical pain.60 Accepting these
principles as true, additional questions arise: “where does one end and the
55. See id. at 9 (referencing a Boston and Veteran’s Administration study indicating that some
individuals do not respond to medication).
56. See id. at 16–17 (examining how chronic pain caused Dr. Pizzo to slip into depression);
see generally Philip A. Pizzo, Lessons in Pain Relief—A Personal Postgraduate Experience, 369
New
ENG.
J.
MED.
1092,
1092
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1306467 (describing his year long experience
seeking a diagnosis for lower back pain).
57. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16; see also Pizzo, supra note 56 (describing how he began to
develop symptoms of depression due to the inability to diagnosis his pain).
58. See Pizzo, supra note 56 (explaining that some of Pizzo’s physicians believed that the
pain was neuropathic in origin, but without a defined trigger to explain it); see also Ruthann
Richter, A Physician’s Personal Odyssey with Chronic Pain, SCOPE (Sept. 18, 2013),
http://scopeblog.stanford.edu/2013/09/18/a-physicians-personal-odyssey-with-chronic-pain/
(quoting Phillip Pizzo’s journey in diagnosing his pain, where physicians suggested his condition
was largely psychological).
59. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16, 29; see also Pizzo, supra note 56, at 1092 (explaining
that after 10 months of pain and many negative exams and ineffective treatments, his condition
was finally diagnosed as relating to the sciatic nerve).
60. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that physical pain was not more real than pain that
comes from a less ascertainable and correctable source); see also Susanne Babbel, The
Connections Between Emotional Stress, Trauma, and Physical Pain, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 8,
2010),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/somatic-psychology/201004/the-connectionsbetween-emotional-stress-trauma-and-physical-pain (stating that those who experience trauma are
often at a higher risk to experience chronic pain).
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other begin? Are they really the same thing? Do they use the same brain
systems or mechanisms? Or are they two sort of very separate things that
can interact in other ways?”61

C.

Distinct Circuits for Physical and Social Pain

Professor Wager presented the “common systems view.”62 He stated,
the theory is that we evolved a physical pain system, a
nociceptive system, [to respond to and avoid injury and
other threats to bodily integrity,] and on top of that, we
developed brain mechanisms for representing the social
world, for thinking about what you’re thinking about me
and whether you like me or not, whether you’re rejecting
me or accepting me. Those circuits that process physical
pain are being co-opted by these social and emotional
processes.63
Wager argues against a strong form of this theory, proposing instead
that physical and emotional pain involve separate brain circuits and should
be discriminable with neuroimaging.64
One weakness in the “common systems view” is that it seems to
overlook the multiple potential functions of a single anatomical brain
region. While several studies point to the anterior cingulate as a region
commonly activated in both social and physical pain, Professor Wager
pointed out that this brain area has neurons that seem to respond
specifically to nociceptive stimuli as well as neighboring cells that respond
to cognitive demands.65 “If you activate the anterior cingulate in the fMRI
61. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16–17 (stating that these questions arose after finding that the
distinctions were unclear when comparing pain that caused a change in outlook and depression,
and where emotional trauma and depression causes physical pain).
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 17. For example, a well known paper reported that emotional pain experienced with
social rejection activates the same brain pattern as physical pain. Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Does
Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion, 302 SCIENCE 290–91 (2003).
64. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27–28.
65. Id. at 17; see W. D. Hutchison et al., Pain-Related Neurons in the Human Cingulate
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 403, 404 (1999) (identifying cortical neurons that were
responsive to painful stimuli in humans, resembling those classified as nociceptive specific or
high threshold in animal studies); Kristin L Hillman & David K Bilkey, Neural Encoding of
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scanner, you’re averaging over many, many billions of neurons. Every bit
that we measure in [a] fMRI is a ballpark five and half million neurons, and
they do different things.”66 In Wager’s view, the circuits associated with
social and physical pain might appear similar only because functional maps
are blurred together at the spatial resolution that the current neuroimaging
technology provides.67
Despite the number of questions that remain unanswered, Professor
Wager remains optimistic that science will “be able to address issues and
use brain imaging to actually provide signals that can tell us whether
emotional pain and physical pain are the same thing, and how much
physical pain somebody is feeling, at least in the area of acute pain.”68
D.

Achieving Accuracy with Neuroimaging Markers of Physical and
Emotional Pain

In order to get around these unanswered questions, some use
neuroimaging to “identify something that really sensitively tracks how
much pain somebody is feeling and tracks that specifically, so it can’t
respond to other things that clearly aren’t pain.”69 There have been several
attempts at doing so, typically classifying whether a healthy subject is
experiencing pain with an accuracy rate higher than 80 percent.70 In a
Competitive Effort in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1290, 1293,
1296 (2012) (finding reward aversion and adjacent reward seeking responsive neurons in the
anterior cingulate cortex of mice).
66. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18.
67. See id. at 18 (stating that while the image appears to look the same because it is blurry, a
higher resolution may reveal that they are different); see also Hiroaki Mano & Ben Seymour,
Pain: A Distributed Brain Information Network?,PLOS BIOLOGY 3 (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002037
&representation=PDF (explaining that there is wiggle room for a theory of a single subjective pain
region because it is very possible that this exists but that it is just not discernable with current
neuroimaging technology).
68. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Choong-Wan Woo et al., Separate Neural
Representations for Physical Pain and Social Rejection 4 (Jan. 6, 2015) (published in NATURE
COMMUNICATIONS)
(on
file
with
NIH)
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4285151/ (showing separate fMRI pattern
representations for physical and social “pain”).
69. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic
Signature of Physical Pain, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1388, 1390 (2013) (discussing a study on the
sensitivity and specificity of pain).
70. See Justin E. Brown et al., Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of
Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, PLOS ONE 4
(Sept.
13,
2011),
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0024124&re
presentation=PDF (establishing the feasibility of physiology based pain detection, at an 80.6
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recent paper co-authored by Wager, accuracy was even higher, with
accuracy between 90–100 percent.71 This “pain signature”—called the
Neurologic Pain Signature (“NPS”)—was specific to physical (thermal)
pain, and did not respond to social pain, despite clear overlapping activity
patterns between the two types of pain.72 Since that study was published,
Wager and his team have been testing the NPS in other ways.73 According
to Wager, “you can’t think it up and down and you can fool it with a
placebo.”74 With regard to the first claim, Wager’s group recently showed
that changes in pain caused by increasing stimulus intensity were mediated
by the NPS while changes in pain caused by cognitive self regulation
(imagining pain to be damaging and dangerous versus non-bothersome and
non-harmful) were mediated by a separate system.75 With regard to the
second claim, Wager’s study76 showed that when the NPS tracked relief
that was caused by a pain relieving opioid drug (Remifentanil), there were
no effects on people’s beliefs that they were given a drug (placebo effects),
in spite of significant placebo effects on the pain those participants
reported.77 In other, ongoing studies, the NPS is similarly unaffected by
standard manipulations of expectations that create changes in pain reports.78
Wager said: “What that might mean is with this pain system, it’s not that if
you decide you need more compensation or you need to communicate that
something hurts more that you’ll turn up this brain signal. It’s giving us
percent accuracy rate); see also Enrico Schulz et al., Decoding an Individual’s Sensitivity to Pain
from the Multivariate Analysis of EEG Data, 22 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1118, 1120 (2011), available
at http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/5/1118.full.pdf+html (discussing a study of
decoding an individual’s sensitivity to pain with an accuracy of 83 percent).
71. See Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1396 (indicating that the neurologic signature showed
sensitivity and specificity of 94 percent or higher).
72. Id. at 1394, 1395 (suggesting overlapping but different responses to physical and social
pain); see also Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18 (citing to their study, where they found that pain was
specific to physical pain and did not respond to emotional events or stimuli).
73. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18, 19 (stating that Wager’s team is finding that the intensity of
emotional pain can be tracked in different ways); see also Choong-Wan Woo et al., Distinct Brain
Systems Mediate the Effects of Nociceptive Input and Self-Regulation of Pain, PLOS BIOLOGY 2
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002036
&representation=PDF (Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that pain could be tracked in various brain systems).
74. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18.
75. Woo, supra note 73, at 1 (finding that pain reports are associated with two dissociable
functional systems).
76. Lauren Y. Atlas et al., Dissociable Influences of Opiates and Expectations on Pain, 32 J.
NEUROSCIENCE
8053
(2012),
available
at
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/32/23/8053.full.pdf+html.
77. Id. at 8053 (finding that Remifentanil and expectancy of drug delivery both reduced pain,
but the drug effects on the pain reports and the fMRI activity did not interact with expectancy).
78. See Wager et al., supra note 69 supp. app. at 29 (the supporting online material for the
article indicated that pain signature responses were mainly influenced by the drug itself, rather
than expectation of drug delivery).
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something that is independent of that. That might be useful in a legal
context.”79 Other ongoing work is determining different detectors of
emotional pain independent of physical pain.80 “That means that we’re
moving closer to having a readout of what’s the real sort of acute pain, at
least, and what’s the overlay of emotional response. And, at least in the
cases we’ve tested, they don’t turn out to be the same thing.”81
E.

Isolating Brain Circuits for Emotional and Physical Chronic Pain

A remaining issue was whether a pain signature or an emotional
signature would be effective in isolating physical pain from emotional pain
in a chronic pain patient. Professor Haythornthwaite suggested that the
limitation with the current state of technology (described above)82 is that
the studies involved provocation of physical pain or emotional/social
pain.83 In chronic pain, there can be no apparent provocation.84 Professor
Haythornthwaite stated,
the definition of pain includes an emotional component,
which captures the unpleasantness of it, and what we see in
people as they live with persistent pain conditions is that
their emotional life is influencing their experience of pain,
and pain is influencing their emotional life. And it’s hard to
tease the two apart.85

79. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18–19.
80. See, e.g., Mary Helen Immordino-Yang et al., Correlations Between Socia Emotional
Feelings and Anterior Insula Activity are Independent from Visceral States but Influenced by
Culture,
FRONTIERS
HUMAN
NEUROSCIENCE
1,
6
(Sept.
16,
2014),
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00728/full (finding that emotional pain
could be stimulated through the anterior insula as well as through external factors).
81. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 19; see also Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1393 (noting that the
average signature responses were differentiated from painful and non-painful conditions).
82. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Mano & Seymour, supra note 67 (explaining the
limitations in current neuroimaging technology).
83. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 19.
84. See Mark Laslett, Evidence-Based Diagnosis and Treatment of the Painful Sacroiliac
Joint, 16 J. MANUAL & MANIPULATIVE THERAPY 142, 143–44 (2008) (explaining that when
comparing the efficacy of sacroiliac joint tests, provocation was not considered an effective test in
chronic pain).
85. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Naomi I. Eisenberger & Matthew D. Lieberman,
Why Rejection Hurts: A Common Neural Alarm System for Physical and Social Pain, 8 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 294, 294 (finding that social pain and emotional pain overlap in their neural and
computational mechanisms).
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Professor Wager concurred with this point and added his belief that “it’s a
feedback cycle.”86 He also noted that even in the case where he could
potentially isolate physical and emotional components of a chronic pain
patient’s condition, it would not change the reality of the patient’s
suffering.87 Professor Haythornthwaite added that suffering is the real issue
in chronic pain, and suffering is clearly emotional.88 Thus, although the
distinction between emotional and physical pain might be much simpler to
conceptualize in experiments involving healthy subjects, in the case of
chronic pain, it is unclear whether emotional and physical components can
be isolated.89
IV.
A.

CHALLENGES FOR NEUROIMAGING AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Limitations in the Interpretation of Neuroimaging Data

Dr. James Pekar of Johns Hopkins University and the F. M. Kirby
Research Center for Functional Brain Imaging at the Kennedy Krieger
Institute, and Dr. Karen Davis both spoke about the current limitation of
neuroimaging for problems like chronic pain.90 Professor Pekar noted that
the interpretation of neuroimaging data is subject to important limitations.91
Specifically, fMRI signals are highly dependent on “inter-individual
differences in physiology.”92 Factors such as physical fitness, elevation
levels, corresponding hematocrit levels, and even variations in a woman’s
monthly cycle can all greatly affect fMRI scans.93 So for example, the
reading of a brain scan from an individual who flew in from a place with a
86. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame
and Anger in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO
[REV. JUR. U.P.R.] 97, 108 (1998) (describing a negative feedback cycle and the difficulty in
separating emotion from pain).
87. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P. 2d 880,
883 (Cal. 1972) (noting that the infliction of emotional pain results in no less of a compensable
injury).
88. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20–21.
89. See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 287–78 (2005)
(showing how chronic pain overlaps with psychiatric and medical diagnoses).
90. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 17, 25.
91. Id. (commenting that fMRI scans are susceptible to changes caused by individual factors).
92. Id. at 25; see also Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior:
Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
271, 280 (2007) (critiquing the interpretational accuracy of fMRI scans).
93. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining how various environmental factors influence
how physicists interpret fMRI readings); see generally Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 92
(stressing that changes in different bodily systems can affect the fMRI’s reading of neural
activity).
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high altitude like Colorado would have to be interpreted differently than a
similar brain scan from an individual who resides at sea level.94 Similarly,
very different brain scans may not indicate differing levels of pain, but
rather may be a result of a “difference in hematic rate, or difference in the
amount of red blood cells they have because of the elevations that they’ve
been living at.”95
Professor Wager acknowledged the importance of recognizing these
limitations, but argued that they are not insurmountable.96 The first step in
mitigating these limitations is to know more about the person whose brain
is being scanned.97 If an individual’s particular circumstances—like a
person’s residence at a high altitude—are known, then the studies can be
calibrated to account for these differences.98 Once this is done, interindividual differences are less problematic in the neuroimaging of pain.99
B.

Future Research Directions in the Area of Emotion and Chronic
Pain

Offering suggestions as to how to move forward, the panelists stressed
the need for additional research and data.100 Professor Haythornthwaite
commented on the need for a more diverse sample population, as current
studies lack equal representation across lines of sex, race, age, and
education.101 There was also a suggestion that the courts could perform
94. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining the nuances of fMRI interpretation).
95. Id.; see also Concomitant Physiologic Changes as Potential Confounds for BOLD-Based
fMRI: A Checklist, PRACTICAL FMRI: THE NUTS & BOLTS (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://practicalfmri.blogspot.com/2014/12/concomitant-physiological-changes-as.html (describing
“hematic rate” and variation in fMRI readings).
96. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (responding to Dr. Pekar’s discussion of outside
influences on fMRI scans).
97. See id. (describing the need to control for individual circumstances); see also Stuart W.S.
MacDonald et al., Intra-Individual Variability in Behavior: Links to Brain Structure,
Neurotransmission and Neuronal Activity, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 474, 474 (2003),
available at http://drsmorey.org/bibtex/upload/MacDonald:etal:2006.pdf (highlighting the need to
include intra-individual variability to predict outcomes).
98. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (alluding to test calibrations of other disciplines such as
biology); see also Xin Di et al., Calibrating BOLD fMRI Activations with Neurovascular and
Anatomical Constraints, 23 CEREBRAL CORTEX 255, 255 (2013), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.368.6282&rep=rep1&type=pdf
(describing fMRI calibration methods, which can account for individual differences).
99. See Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1396 (describing the necessary calibration of interindividual differences for clinical studies of pain).
100. See, e.g., Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (stressing the need for clearer standards in brain
scanning).
101. See id. at 10 (remarking that the current lack of diverse samples reduces the legitimacy of
results); see also Carmen R. Green et al., The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and
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their own data collection and research.102 Professor Wager added that we
also need more rigorous neuroimaging research.103 Neuroimaging
technology and tools to perform data analysis will certainly continue to
improve,104 and the answer to the question of whether the technology will
be good enough to isolate independent circuits seems certain to be “yes,”
while the answer to the question of whether a chronic pain experience can
be broken down in terms of such circuits is less clear.
V.

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Professor Chandler described several differences and similarities
between Canadian and U.S. law as they relate to the myriad of issues
mentioned above.105 For example, she suggested that from the perspective
of the philosophy of mind, American law tends to lean toward dualism,
while Canadian law is in some (but not all) cases more materialist.106 She
stated that “as we’re moving in the direction of collapsing the mind into the
brain, . . . this is a very interesting challenge that is throughout the law and
plays out in very interesting ways.”107 In particular, this comparison was
made on the basis of various rules of tort law that draw distinctions between
mental and physical phenomena in the United States, which are not present
in Canada.108 Professor Chandler illustrated this apparent difference in
dualism/materialism:
This is a rule called the doctrine of mitigation or the
doctrine of avoidable consequences . . . which essentially
says that if you are a plaintiff and you’re going to get

Ethnic Disparities in Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277, 277 (2003) (highlighting the ethnic disparities in
pain studies).
102. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20–21 (proposing judicial reforms that could spur progress);
see also David R. Williams & Toni D. Rucker, Understanding and Addressing Racial Disparities
in Health Care, 21 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 75, 82 (2000) (arguing that better data collection is
required to ameliorate differences in racial impact).
103. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20 (claiming that advances such as higher resolution will
improve the tracking of different kinds of pain).
104. See Jean-Baptiste Poline et al., Data Sharing in Neuroimaging Research, 6 FRONTIERS
NEUROINFORMATICS
1
(Apr.
5
2012),
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fninf.2012.00009/full
(describing
expected
improvements in neuroimaging).
105. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11.
106. See id. (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of dualism and materialism as it relates
to Canadian and American law).
107. Id.
108. See id. (including the Canadian doctrine of mitigation that applies to plaintiffs).
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compensation from a tortfeasor, you are expected to take
reasonable steps to limit your harm. . . . In Canada,
judges, . . . including in the chronic pain context, will
require claimants/plaintiffs to do what is called psychiatric
mitigation.109
For example, if a claimant had seen a doctor who recommended that the
claimant take antidepressants, the judge can cut down the damages or
disentitle the claimant if the claimant did not follow the recommended
mitigation.110 In the U.S. courts, Chandler believes that there is less of this
psychiatric mitigation, but stated that U.S. courts would uphold a
recommendation to follow the treatment recommendations for nonpsychiatric illnesses (for example, taking diabetes medication).111 While
this is only a single example of differences in policies between countries, it
serves as a reminder that taking an international perspective might be useful
in exploring the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to
similar social and legal problems.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The distinction between whether a condition is reflected by physical or
emotional disability can have a profound effect on outcomes in various
legal settings.112 Chronic pain has both physical and emotional
components;113 indeed, it might be argued that without both components in

109. Id. at 11; see also Yehuda Adar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages;
Two Sister Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2013) (outlining
the doctrine of mitigation); see also Vaughan Black, Cultural Thin Skills, 60 UNIVERSITY OF NEW
BRUNSWICK LAW JOURNAL [U.N.B.L.J.] 186, 191 (2010) (Can.) (describing the doctrine of
psychiatric mitigation in Canadian practice).
110. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11; see also Olga Redko, Religious Practice as a “Thin Skull” in
the Context of Civil Liability, 72 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW [UT FAC.
L. REV.] 41, 48–49 (2014) (Can.) (describing a Canadian court’s view of a plaintiff’s post-injury
obligations and limits of a defendant’s responsibility).
111. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11; see also Kevin Klein, Mitigation of Psychological Damages:
An Economic Analysis of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to Emotional
Distress Injuries, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 405, 409 (2004) (describing mandatory treatment
requirements for plaintiffs in order to mitigate damages).
112. See Habib Hanna, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Disparate Treatment of Similarly
Situated Taxpayers Under the Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 162–
63 (2010) (highlighting a form of disparate legal treatment between persons suffering emotional
and physical injuries, respectively).
113. See Rickey S. Miller, Psychological Approaches to Chronic Pain: Assessment and
Treatment, 7 ADVOC. Q. 148, 148 (1987) (highlighting the dual nature of pain).
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concert, the nature of pain is very different.114 Neuroimaging studies have
provided evidence for the emotional and physical sides of pain, even
allowing us to isolate physical and emotional pain in highly controlled
experimental settings.115 But for chronic pain, there is still limited evidence
that emotional or physical characteristics can be isolated. Legal systems
dealing with chronic pain should have an understanding of the mechanisms
related to the development and maintenance of chronic pain, and the results
from human neuroimaging studies can be particularly instructive to this
end.

114. Pain has distinct unpleasantness and sensory aspects, but even distinguishing those
components can be difficult. See Howard L. Fields, Pain: An Unpleasant Topic, 82 J. PAIN S61,
S61–S62 (Supp. 1 1999) (discussing the proper modalities of pain).
115. See Naomi Eisenberger, Understanding the Moderators of Physical and Emotional Pain:
A Neural Systems-Based Approach, 19 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 189, 190 (2008) (demonstrating
advances in neuroimaging).

